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“Then Sings My Soul” 
 




“What must the world be like, what must I be like, if between me and the 
world the phenomenon of music can occur?” –Victor Zuckerkandl 
 
Well meaning evangelicals unfamiliar with Nancey Murphy’s philosophical theology 
frequently worry that her work in philosophy of mind has the effect of depriving us of our 
souls. When such an objection is voiced after a speaking engagement, Murphy’s 
“reassurance” is predictable: “Don’t worry! There is nothing to be lost; we never had souls 
to begin with!”1 
Underneath her wry reply is a deep concern that philosophical confusion about 
“having a soul” is seriously undermining Christian discipleship. For example, it has 
become second nature for many Christians to hold that the soul is more important than 
the body; regardless of the state of one’s body, the state of one’s soul is what really counts. 
Using this line of reasoning, St. Augustine (d. 430) concluded that the rape of women by 
invading barbarians did not cost them their chastity. He reasoned that chastity is 
                                                 
1
 I am extremely thankful for the many helpful comments made by my generous colleagues Aaron 
James, Colin McGuigan, D. Michael Cox, Elizabeth Farnsworth, Ethan Smith, Jason Hentschel, and Lucas 
Martin. 
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primarily a property of the soul that becomes the body’s by association: “not only the 
souls of Christian women who have been forcibly violated during their captivity, but also 
their bodies, remain holy.”2  
Augustine’s conclusion seems forced, to say the least. But the line of reasoning that 
cannot but bifurcate bodies and souls can be avoided if we reconsider where to imagine 
the dividing line between the “inner” and the “outer.” It is without question that human 
experience is marked by both “inner” and “outer” aspects. (I cannot feel your pain in the 
same way you feel it.) The question is where best to locate the dividing line. I cannot deny 
the popularity of the dualistic picture, which sees the dividing line “in here” (pointing to 
one’s head or heart) as it were, between body and mind (or soul). But there is another 
way to understand the dividing line.  
I begin with the suggestion (following Stephen Mulhall3) that the primary dividing 
line between “inner” and “outer” is not between soul and body. Rather the dividing line is 
better understood as lying between body and surroundings. This is not a bright, red line 
but a fuzzy boundary constituted by a set of “skins.” After explaining the concept of 
“skins,” I will argue that both language and technology function as “skins” in distinctive 
ways. The upshot of my reasoning is that “soul” is not something we have but something 
we are. The difference in these verbs, “have “ and “are,” connotes a difference between 
substance and time. In surrendering the notion of souls-as-substance, Murphy is not 
                                                 
2
 St. Augustine, City of God, 1.16-19 (trans. Gerald G. Walsh, et al., ed. Vernon J. Bourke; Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), 53. For an earlier version of this argument see Brad J. Kallenberg, "Holistic 
Spirituality as Witness," in Vital Christianity: Justice, Spirituality, and Christian Practice, ed. David L. 
Weaver-Zercher and William H. Willimon (New York & London: T & T Clark, 2005). 
3
 Stephen Mulhall, Wittgenstein's Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense, and Imagination in 
Philosophical Investigations §§243-315 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2007). 
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obligating herself to deny the notion of souls-as-timeful. I end with a comparison of the 
grammars of “time” and “soul” by considering the nature of music. 
 
 
An Alternative Model to Dualism: Body-World 
In biological terms, we call the surface that demarcates body from world our “skin.” 
If skin is taken to be the dividing line, then everything under the skin is presumed, 
functionally at least, to be a unity—not two parts, but one. I assume this as my starting 
point: humans are bodysouls (or perhaps “soulish bodies”).4 In short I am proposing that 
we deliberately abandon anthropological dualism (fig. 1) in favor of anthropological 
holism (fig. 2): 
        
Figure 1 
                                                 
4
 Thus Wittgenstein’s observation, “The human body is the best picture of the human soul.” Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees, trans. G. E. M. 
Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), Part II.iv, p.178. For contemporary trends in philosophy of mind 
see Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Malony, eds., Whatever Happened to the Soul? 
Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1998). 




The latter picture makes “skin” the crucial dividing line between the “inner” and the 
“outer” dimensions of human experience. 
The epidermis, of course, is only one of our skins. The epidermis is the interface 
between us and the tactile world. If all we had were tactile sensations, the world would 
seem to us very thin, for most tactile events take place on or near the surface.5 The 
olfactory “world” for human beings is a bit further out. The olfactory skin, as it were, is 
“thicker.” Sometimes, though not always, we can smell something stinky before we step in 
it. Some smells (e.g., ammonia, fresh brewed coffee, Pinesol) fill the entire room. Of 
course, the human sense of smell is nothing compared to that of a bloodhound, or a shark, 
or a bear. 
                                                 
5
 Exceptions would include temperature gradients which can be detected as we approach hot objects. 
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The “skins” of our eyes and ears reach much, much farther than our tactile and 
olfactory skins. Here again our visual and aural worlds are nothing compared to eagles or 
beagles. But compared to our own tactile and olfactory senses, the “skins” of our seeing 
and hearing are extremely baggy—the outer extent of “me” has a greater range. 
Language as skin 
It is in this spirit that Herbert McCabe writes of language as “skin.”6 As each of our 
sensory skins are interfaces between a person and his or her respective surroundings, so 
too is language. Both kinds of skin, sensory and linguistic, are means by which our 
surroundings are “taken up” by us, become meaningful to us, become significant for us. 
When I lived in densely populated southern California, I encountered an astonishing 
variety of animals while on long trail runs in the foothills: bobcats, rattlesnakes, deer, 
bear, owls, and, most surprisingly, entire flocks of sheep! Imagine that on one such run, I 
and the flock of sheep espy a wolf.7 For both the sheep and I, the wolf is significant; its 
presence spells danger. The meaningfulness of the wolf is “taken up” by means of sensory 
skins by both the sheep and me. At the moment of sensory perception the sheep and I 
share a world of significances, a world of meanings; we are “in communion,” we are co-
munus, same world. Thus we both react as we are apt to do—nostrils flare, muscles tense, 
eyes widen, head rears, heartbeat quickens. However, unlike the sheep, I have another 
skin, the skin of language. The wolf’s meaning is also taken up by means of my linguistic 
                                                 
6
 Herbert McCabe, Law, Love and Language (New York: Continuum, 2004), 74. 
7
 The illustration is McCabe’s. "Soul, Life, Machines and Language," in Faith within Reason, ed. and 
introduced by Brian Davies; with a foreword by Denys Turner (London & New York: Continuum, 2007), 123-
49. 
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skin. Unlike my other skins, which are more or less tight fitting, the “skin” of language is 
loose fitting, extending much farther than eyesight and earshot—it circles the globe and 
extends backwards in history. I have listened to tales around campfires, watched NOVA, 
read scientific accounts, and even heard music recounting the behavior of wolves. In the 
linguistic world the wolf is also significant. But this is not a world that I can share with 
the sheep (“Well, Dolly, things are looking baaaaaad for us!”). I have read and heard that 
the wolf is one of the only other mammals that, like humans, hunts in the daylight and 
hunts in packs. So the sheep, who cannot help but flee directly from the lone wolf will 
unwittingly run directly into the teeth of the rest of the pack while I, running 
orthogonally (at 90°), may escape both the scout and its pack. 
On McCabe’s account, the shared world-of-meanings (co-munus) of language is of a 
higher order than the shared world (co-munus) of animal senses. I share the latter with 
other mammals; I share the former with other language-speakers. There is an 
asymmetrical relationship between the two. The sensory world is, in an important sense, 
the “material basis” for the linguistic world.8 (It is because we naturally squint at bright 
lights that the word “bright” is used in the way we use it.) Yet the linguistic world is of a 
                                                 
8
 I might have equally said that human language “supervenes” upon bodily senses so long as 
“supervenience” is understood in a non-reductive way. I’m indebted to the extension Nancey Murphy has 
given to the philosophy of mind of Jaegwon Kim. See, for example, Nancey Murphy, "Nonreductive 
Physicalism: Philosophical Issues," in Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of 
Human Nature, ed. Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Malony (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress 
Press, 1998), 127-48; "Supervenience and the Downward Efficacy of the Mental: A Nonreductive Physicalist 
Account of Human Action," in Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. 
Robert John Russell, et al. (Vatican City State & Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory & CTNS, 1999), 147-64. 
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higher order than that available to other animals.9 The linguistic world does not and 
cannot be reduced to sensory meanings any more than a sphere, which exists in three 
dimensions, could be exhaustively explained to someone living in “Flatland.”10 Yet in both 
animal and linguistic worlds, there are sets of interfaces between you and your 
surroundings. To recall: I am proposing that the crucial dividing line between you and 
your surroundings is not that between “mind” and “body,” a division “in here” (head or 
heart), but a set of skins between your body and your surroundings. It is this image that 
will help us get clearer on the possibility of one more skin: Technolgy. 
 
Technology as skin 
In order for it to function as a skin, Technology must be seen as a vast system in 
which human beings are today embedded. When attempting to define “Technology” with 
a capital “T,” it is helpful to think in terms of mereological systems, systems of parts 
whose properties emerge at increasing levels of complexity.11 To choose a familiar example, 
the basic building block of material stuff is (say) the atom and each atom possesses 
certain properties, such as the property of mass. When atoms are bound together in 
various complex ways, molecules are formed. Molecules also have the property of mass. In 
fact, molecules have a mass that is additive, simply the sum of the mass of each 
                                                 
9
 Except, perhaps, the dog. Of all mammals, dogs alone have the natural ability to read human faces 
and follow the gesture of our pointing—even when we point with our eyes! Even Koko the gorilla could not 
learn to follow this simple gesture of pointing. See Dan Child, "Dogs Decoded," in NOVA (9 Nov 2010). 
10
 Edwin A. Abbot, "Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions," Public domain, 
http://www.math.brown.edu/~banchoff/gc/Flatland/. 
11
 For Murphy’s own employment of this notion see Nancey Murphy and George F. R. Ellis, On the 
Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cosmology and Ethics (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996). 
 Then Sings My Soul  8 
constituent atom. No surprise here. However, at the level of the molecule, a new property 
emerges—three dimensional shape. Dextrose (or D-glucose) and L-glucose are chemically 
identical, but stereoisomers of each other; one is “right-handed” with respect to three 
dimensions and the other “left-handed.” The property of dimensionality cannot be 
reduced to anything at the atomic level; it is an emergent property. Large organic 
molecules, join to form organelles, organelles form cells, cells form organs, organs form 
organisms, organisms form societies, etc. At each level of complexity new properties 
emerge that cannot be reduced to lower level phenomena. 
The same emergence of properties can be observed in the mereological organization 
of Technology. Every technology can be analyzed into its constituent parts.  
            
Figure 3 Mereological hierarchies 
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The corollary to atoms are called “first-order machines.”12 The crowbar is a first-order 
machine with correlative first-order properties (i.e., the principle of the lever). First-order 
machines can be creatively combined to form second-order machines, and second-order 
machines can be combined to form third- and fourth-order machines. At some point the 
vast network of simple properties becomes an infrastructure (indoor plumbing; 
electricity; cell phone, etc.). Let us not get sidetracked by trying to draw clear boundaries 
between the orders, but simply admit the point that new properties may emerge at each 
level of complexity. I will capitalize “Technology” as reminder that we are not considering 
isolated hammers or crowbars but also vast infrastructures and networked industries, the 
entire mereological system that has made us, together, as a species, a “cyborg society.”   
The interweaving of emergent properties and human living makes plausible the 
notion that Technology itself is one of our skins. Human beings have skins we share with 
animals—in addition to the five senses, animals have the kinesthetic sense 
(proprioception) and balance (equilibrioception), etc. But human beings also share a 
linguistic skin with other human speakers. In addition, residents of developed countries 
share the skin of Technology by which we—together—“take up” meanings, the sharing of 
which constitute (at least in part) our contemporary social-cyborg world, our world of 
meanings, our co-munus. When my automated email replay announces that I’m blissfully 
offline for three weeks in July, people trying to reach me take that to be as meaningful 
(perhaps more so) than were they to walk past my home and notice my car is gone. Many 
                                                 
12
 The terminology derives from Barry Allen, Artifice and Design: Art and Technology in Human 
Experience (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
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of us are individual cyborgs: we have fillings in our teeth, we wear eyeglasses, we 
ambulate by means of artificial hips and knees, and so on. But together we form a cyborg 
society; we are social cyborgs.  
 
Technology as impeding Christian co-munus 
Christian discipleship, which Murphy is intent on preserving in her work (whether 
directly13 or indirectly14), presupposes the vitality of an extant community. By her lights, 
the vitality of Christian community is threatened by soul-body dualism. Reconceiving the 
division between inner and outer as comprised by a set of skins may help repair the 
distortion wreaked by dualism. However the skin of Technology itself may be a distorting 
influence in the formation of Christian community. To be a community entails, among 
other things, the sharing of a world of meaning. As I’ve argued above, creatures come to 
share a world of meaning by means of “skins.” Animals of a given genus share a world of 
significance constituted by meanings taken up by their physical senses. In addition, 
language speakers share a higher-order world of meanings, namely those taken up by the 
skin of language.  We might say that the limits of one’s skin(s) is the limit of one’s world. 
But now a puzzle emerges: if the skin of eyesight “takes up” meanings that are ocular, and 
ears “take up” meanings that are aural, what kind of meaning does technological skin 
                                                 
13
 E.g., Nancey Murphy, "Using Macintyre’s Method in Christian Ethics," in Virtues and Practices in 
the Christian Tradition: Christian Ethics after MacIntyre, ed. Nancey Murphy, Brad J. Kallenberg, and Mark 
Thiessen Nation (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997). 
14
 E.g., Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? Philosophical and 
Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
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“take up” and in what sense might this uptake affect and even distort Christian 
discipleship?  
 
Technology as a Time Bandit 
To recap: thus far I’ve tried to give an alternative to the dualistic picture of human 
persons by exploring what changes in our perception of technology follow if we 
reconceive the boundary between the “inner” and “outer” as lying not “in here,” between 
mind and body, but rather “out here,” between body and surroundings. But note: on this 
alternative picture, everyday phrases such as “he’s my soulmate” or “her soul is in a 
frightful state” are not barred on the grounds that “soul” has no substantive referent.15 In 
point of fact, they are not barred at all. Rather, such phrases make the rich sense they do 
because soulishness is embodied in our manner (or mode) and ways of being in the world. 
And it is precisely this notion—“ways of being in the world”—that technology threatens 
to change. As we shall see below, a cure for our bewitchment is timeful practices, such as 
music. 
What do I mean by “ways of being in the world?” We are bodies. We are solid. We 
are vulnerable. We are fragile. We are aging. We take up space, and we take up time.16 
Taken together these features mean that our lives can only be recounted in story form; we 
                                                 
15
 As Wittgenstein strove to point out, our trouble is that we are forever at risk of assuming a 
substantive (noun) corresponds to a thing, an object, a substance. “The mistake we are liable to make could 
be expressed thus: We are looking for the use of a sign [‘soul’], but we look for it as though it were an object 
co-existing with the sign.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (New York, NY: Harper and 
Brothers, 1958), 5. 
16
 This way of speaking is drawn from Rowan Williams, "Art: Taking Time and Making Sense," in 
Images of Christ: Religious Iconography in Twentieth-Century British Art. Exhibition Catalogue (St. 
Matthews, Northampton, UK: Centenary Art Committee, 1993), 25-27.  
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are material critters who can only be one place at a time and who journey from 
beginnings through middles to endings, each according to her or his own distinctive plot, 
settings and fellows. For all its benefits, when taken to the extreme, Technology-as-skin 
inflicts a kind of myopia on account of which we can no longer quite see the storied 
character of creaturely life. Technology-as-skin obscures the timefulness of the meanings 
we uptake. All of our other skins take up meanings that only make sense in time. We see 
the flight of the baseball in time; we hear the progress of a symphony in time; we feel the 
ever-so-slow abatement of the pain of a stubbed toe in time; we tell stories that take time. 
But the meanings taken up through our technological skin are liable to be untruthful for 
having collapsed temporality into spatiality. 
Bodily (aka creaturely) engagement with our surroundings is simultaneously spatial 
and temporal. I spot a friend in a crowded room and rush to deliver a hug. That episode is 
timeful—it has a beginning, a middle and an end. It is also spatial—I cross the room, 
bumping into other bodies along the way, and deliver an embrace that takes seriously the 
robustness or fragility of the friend and delivers a bear hug or a light squeeze. This event 
is at once spatial and timeful. In sharp contrast, Technology has the effect of shifting our 
attention, sometimes violently so, to objects-in-space to the exclusion of living-in-time.17 
It is not so much that technology-as-skin is unable to register the “passing” of time. It is 
rather that Technology-as-skin distorts our perception of time, often by turning time 
itself into a “thing” with “thingish” properties. It is no wonder that we Thoroughly 
                                                 
17
 Edwin Hutchins explains that Micronesian (i.e., pre-modern) navigation takes place not in terms of 
distance but in terms of time alone. See Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1996), 65-115. 
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Modern Millies have become even more enamored than our medieval forebears by souls-
as-thingish. This may strike some as a surprising claim. But consider: for medievals, 
everything was sacramental; everything was shot through by the presence of God. What 
held all creation together in their eyes was the forever immanent God (Col. 1:17). In 
contrast, today we assume that what holds everything together is a scientific theory about 
stuff. In our modern outlook, to be real a thing must be constituted by stuffness and be 
intelligible against the field of all the stuffs there are in the cosmos.18 Thus do Christians 
fight for the recognition of the “soul’s reality” as real by asserting its materiality: the soul 
is a substance, a special “immaterial” substance, but a substance nonetheless.19 But I 
digress. I was addressing the issue of our conception of time as itself thingish. 
As every child will confirm, “things” have shape and weight and position—all of 
which can be specified to (virtually) any degree of accuracy we desire.20 Since the 
scientific revolution, technological tools have enabled ever-increasing precision in our 
measurements of these thingish properties. Thus the question seems inevitable: Cannot 
time itself be quantified with equal precision? We seem happy to imagine so. It is said 
that the continuous cold Cesium fountain atomic clock (known as the FOCS-1) in 
Switzerland can be trusted not to lose more than one second every 30 million years! But 
notice that underneath all the striving for precise measurement of time is the 
presupposition that time is something material, like a brick. We can talk about the mass 
                                                 
18
 On the contrast between the enchanted outlook of medieval and the “buffered selves” of modernity, 
see Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA & London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2007). 
19
 Sadly, analytic theism has today done the same to God, making God a part of the furniture of the 
universe as the only conceivable way to champion God’s reality. 
20
 Within quantum limits, of course. 
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of the brick because we all know that bricks do not spontaneously change size, shape, 
weight or location! Similarly, when we set out to measure time, we presume that time 
plays fairly, that it doesn’t change “shape,” “weight” or “location” (note the spatial 
metaphors), that time is something regular, something divisible into standard units. But 
in fact, I wonder whether “regularity” may be an alien property pressed onto time by 
Technology, first with the invention of the clock and now by the entire Technopoly.21 To 
live under regularized time alters the manner, pattern, and rhythm of our proper way of 
being in God’s world. 
Consider the significance of a very recent shift in English-speaking onomatopoeia. 
When I was a child everybody knew that clocks spoke: the clock says “Tick, tock!” But 
today, if a clock speaks at all—most are silent—the child learns that it says “tick-tick-tick.” 
This change is significant. The difference between a “tick” and a “tock” is not so much the 
character of the sound as the position of the pendulum which swings gently back and 
forth: tick (perhaps to the left) then tock (perhaps to the right). The motion of a 
pendulum is reciprocal. Granted, a pendulum’s period is entirely regular, the reciprocity of 
a pendulum depends only upon the length of the arm (and not its arc). However, the 
motion itself is not constant. The pendulum accelerates as it heads toward its midpoint, 
then decelerates. When it reaches its highest point, it stops and reverses direction, 
accelerating again toward the midpoint. This rhythm of speeding up, slowing down, 
stopping, and changing directions is repeated over and over. Meanwhile the pendulum is 
                                                 
21
 Neil Postman, Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology, Revised ed. (New York: Vintage, 
1993). 
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imperceptibly losing energy (“winding down”) until it finally ceases movement altogether. 
Such a rhythm is a paradigm of the ordinary experience of biological bodies. For example, 
the pendulum mimics the human gait. We lean forward, begin falling, accelerate toward 
the ground until we catch ourselves with an extended leg. Our body position is righted, 
we retract the trailing leg and for a brief instant we are at rest before we fall forward again. 
Reciprocal rhythms are mirrored everywhere in nature. Twice a day the tides change. 
The moon that causes the tides itself passes through phases that recur monthly. Once a 
day the sky passes from night to day. And, perhaps excepting life on the equator, no two 
successive days are identical in duration. Moreover, because the earth’s axis is tipped, its 
annual journey around the sun produces the reciprocal transition of seasons: planting and 
growing, then harvest and rest. 
Perhaps no one in Newton’s day was very much troubled by his suggestion that the 
world was a clock, because the “clock” in view would have been a pendulum clock, and 
the innumerable reciprocal patterns of the cosmos were manifestly obvious in the 
metaphor. But the reciprocal motion of the pendulum clock has given way to, has been 
displaced by, rotary motion. Henry Ford may have benefitted the workers on the 
assembly line when he increased their pay and reduced their workday from nine to eight 
hours. But his motives were more nefarious: an eight-hour shift meant that there could be 
three shifts in a 24-hour period. Like a flywheel that keeps spinning rather than a 
pendulum that is punctuated by moments of rest as it slowly winds down, manufacturing 
could continue unabated by any temporal restrictions. Such changes in manufacturing 
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drove the culture further toward the myth of standardized time.22 Can time be 
standardized like the shape of light bulb sockets or the thread count on nuts and bolts?23 
Perhaps none of my readers is troubled by the standardization of time or the 
universal applicability of “efficiency” as the criterion by which bodily work in time is 
assessed. These are not objections I intend to take up here. My point is simply that the 
kind of meaning we take up by our shared technological skin, and thus the kind of co-
munus we’ve become, is distorted because of what technology has done and continues to 
do to our perception of time. Our other skins do not thus mislead us. Our sensory skins 
adjust to the rhythms of reciprocal time, informing us when time is swift (as when 
engaged in an interesting task) or creeps slowly (as when bored) or when it is moving 
without us (e.g., during sleep) or at a standstill (insomnia). In other words, our sensory 
skins are able to take up meanings that preserve both the spatiality and temporality of 
our bodily existence. Even our linguistic skin does not threaten to distort the timefulness 
of bodily existence. Granted, there are biblical expressions that treat time materially 
(“redeem the time,” “count your days,” and so on). But Christian language also makes 
room for time to serve as its own figure. In other words, Christians need not understand 
time by means of spatial or mechanical or material figures. Time is sui generis, therefore, 
we may only begin to understand it by attending to its manifold intersections with our 
lives. The best place to begin to attend to that intersection is by attuning ourselves to the 
                                                 
22
 For a history of standardization in western engineering see Merritt Roe Smith, "Army Ordnance 
and the 'American System' of Manufacturing, 1815-1861," in Military Enterprise and Technological Change: 
Perspectives on the American Experience, ed. Merritt Roe Smith (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985). 
23
 Bruce Sinclair, "At the Turn of the Screw: William Sellers, the Franklin Institute, and a Standard 
American Thread," Technology and Culture 10, no. 1 (1969): 20-34. 
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way we speak of time, what Wittgenstein called the grammar of the word.24 Thus the 
biblical poets urge us to attend to time’s changing rhythms: “there is a time to break 
down, and a time to build up; a time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to mourn, and a 
time to dance….”25 The telling of such times cannot be answered by consulting the atomic 
clock in Switzerland. Rather, these times come in seasons, in rhythms, and to tell the time 
one must know what is appropriate and proper (“You give them their food at the proper 
time”26). I do not speak hyperbolically. I mean to say that the kind of time learned by 
immersion into, say, literature and poetry better equips us to live well (i.e., truthfully and 
faithfully) as bodies in creation than the kind of tin ear toward time that our 
technological skin gives us. Technologically speaking, the answer to “What time is it?” 
can receive only one true answer, for example, “12:52 pm EST.” But if it is time to mourn 
(or to dance) then “12:52” wildly misses the point of the question. To the same thing 
differently, reciprocal time is inherently storied time while technological time (aka 
mechanical or rotary time, i.e., time conceived as discrete, identical, punctiliar units in 
mere linear sequence) is not essentially story-formed or story-formable. Despite its 
inherent repetition (“tick,” then “tock,” then “tick” again), reciprocal time consists of 
beginnings and middles and endings. So, to the extent we (unwittingly) live by 
technological time our lives are stripped of poetry, leaving us unsung and unstoried.27 
                                                 
24
 “Essence is expressed by grammar.” In stark contrast to the analytic school, which seeks to 
understand a thing by reducing it to its constitutive parts, Wittgenstein leans the other way, insisting that 
what something is is shown by its connections. How we ordinarily speak about time, its grammar, is a 
record of these connections. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §371. See also §373. 
25
 Eccl. 3:4. 
26
 Ps 145:15. See also Eccl 8:5. 
27
 I owe these insights to Aaron James. 
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Music of the Soul 
One way to untangle the confusion over the notion of the soul is to reconceive the 
dividing line between “inner” and “outer.” To recap, the alternative to the received 
account (the Cartesian homunculus; Fig 1) is to understand the boundary as a set of skins 
by means of which we take up various kinds of meanings. The “thinnest” skin is our 
epidermis, while the other skins are “thicker.” The skin of hearing being thicker than the 
skin of smell; the skin of eyesight being thicker than the skin of hearing, and so on. To the 
extent that the “soul” inevitably (but wrongly) gets identified with the “inner,” to 
understand the division as a set of skins may help one see the soul as itself thicker than 
our epidermis, lying not inside, but perhaps well outside our bodies!28 
A second phase of my proposed conceptual therapy involves loosening the grip that 
a particular analogy holds over our understanding of time. As physical critters, human 
beings experience “reality” in terms of both space and time. For the sake of argument, I 
will assume that Catherine Pickstock’s conclusion (without reproducing her argument) 
that technological progress, especially since the time of Peter Ramus (1515), has resulted 
in a perceptual outlook in which temporality tends strongly to be elided in favor of seeing 
                                                 
28
 Wittgenstein often attempted to get readers to see that language does not need to be grounded by 
something more interior, such as “meaning” or “intention,” because there is no way to think the meaning or 
intention of a sentence without simply repeating the sentence. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. 
G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. Peter Winch, English translation with the amended 2nd. ed. 
(Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1980), 10e. If as McCabe suggests, language is a skin, then the work it does is 
not “inner” in the Cartesian sense (“in one’s head” so to speak) but “inner” in the language-as-skin sense 
which is to say, interior to the community of language speakers and thus decidedly “outer” on the Cartesian 
scheme. 
 Then Sings My Soul  19 
spatiality as absolute.29 If human temporal sensibilities have atrophied, then when it 
comes to thinking about the soul, we are left all the more vulnerable to a lopsided 
conception of the “real” solely in terms of spatiality. Also without argument I will assume 
that the priority of spatiality in our perception is often manifest as an attunement to, and 
penchant to think in terms of, materiality: to be counted as real, souls must be substantial. 
I aim to hint in the direction of a challenge to this “must” by supplying one telling 
counterexample. 
I return to the claim made above that time ought to be allowed to serve as its own 
figure (rather than frame our understanding of time along the lines of nontemporal, 
mechanical metaphors). The therapy I propose follows Wittgenstein’s admonition that we 
attend to the ordinary activities in which a word is at home in order to understand it. For 
example, the fact that we understand “cheese” to signify the sort of thing that does not 
spontaneously changes size, weight or location is shown by the simple activity of our 
buying cheese by the pound.30 In the present case, the word is “time” and one of the 
activities in which “time” is at home is the practice of music.  
In his masterful study, Theology, Music and Time, Jeremy Begbie suggests that music  
might be of considerable value in a culture which…is disaffected with certain 
alienating and imprisoning conceptions of linear31 time, which rely on simple 
and rigid patterns of cause and effect, and which can easily lead to mechanistic 
notions of progress….But movements such as the Beethoven [String Quartet in 
                                                 
29
 Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford, UK & 
Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), 49-94. 
30
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §142. 
31
 Begbie does not deny that “linear” has its place in music (e.g., “linear pitch set”), but by the term 
“linear” takes into his sights “simple and rigid patterns of cause and effect, and which can easily lead to 
mechanistic notions of progress” (117). 
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F major] so obviously break through the categories of singular linear narrativity, 
yet while being directional, without evoking temporal chaos.32 
It is important not to miss Begbie’s underlying argument. The linear model of time—on 
which we imagine time as divisible into standard units as though the regularity of these 
units were guaranteed by a rotary mechanism—is drastically incomplete. In so far as 
music (itself a rational activity33) cannot be rationally accounted for by a one-level linear 
model of time, then “[m]usic’s very rationality challenges the assumption that time must 
be conceived in one-level linear terms” (110, emphasis added).  
There are at least two ways that attention to music might provide therapy for our 
bewitchment by the mechanical image of time. First, musical time is not one-leveled, but 
multi-leveled.  
 
Music is multi-leveled 
Wittgenstein once stated what should be obvious, “The temporality of the clock and 
temporality in music….are not by any means equivalent concepts.”34 This is because a 
single piece of music has multiple temporal layers at work. Generally speaking, 
temporality in music is expressed in terms of meter and rhythm. When a tune is played, it 
is possible to identify a time signature simply by observing how a listener claps, or bobs, 
or nods, or toe taps. This is meter. Interestingly, not only are some beats more 
accentuated, than others, but not every beat of the meter is sounded (played). So meter is 
                                                 
32
 Jeremy Begbie, Theology, Music, and Time (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117-
18. Emphasis added. Hereafter, citations will be in text.  
33
 Nicholas Wolterstorff, "The Work of Making a Work of Music," in What Is Music? An Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Music, ed. P. J. Alperson (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1987), 103-29. 
34
 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 80e. 
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intuited (or tacitly detected).35 Bodies are apparently well suited for detecting meter 
because meter is reciprocal, like most natural motions of our bodies. Meter washes over 
us in regular iterations like the breaking of waves upon a seashore. 
The second feature of music that conveys temporality is rhythm. Unlike meter, 
rhythm is explicitly played and therefore always heard.36 If meter is the regularity of the 
breakers (regularity being one of the few features that mechanical time can capture), 
rhythm is the “shape” of each incoming wave. The “shape” of each wave may be unique 
(surfers wait for the “just right” wave to ride), yet the large-scale pattern of their arrivals is 
regular (41).  
Here is where things get interesting: waves are additive. There can be multiple waves 
simultaneously expressed by a series of incoming musical measures. Said differently, as 
measures of music strike the listener’s ears, multiple waves flood over the listener at once, 
each wave embodied in measures of music, but the played measures expressing more 
than one temporal wave at a time. Begbie gives several detailed examples. Consider 
Chopin’s Waltz in A flat major, op. 34, measures 17-24, part of which is reproduced below 
(42). Each measure consists of three beats. But if one looks carefully, measures 17 and 18 
in the treble clef are similar (two dotted half notes) and measures 19 and 20 are similar to 
one another in a different way (three quarter notes, especially visible in the bass clef). 
                                                 
35
 When a beat is played, giving it duration and accent, it is called a pulse. One of the most startling 
pulses in choral music is Brahms Deutsche Requiem. In the second movement, beginning in bar 22, the 
simple ¾ time is expressed by a half note rest followed by a quarter note falling on beat three, followed by a 
half note on beat one of the next measure. The pattern is short-long, 3-1, 3-1, 3-1, 3-1 or unmistakably: lub-
dub, lub-dub, lub-dub; a terrified heartbeat expressing the choral text: “All flesh is grass….” (Isaiah 40:6) 
36
 As Begbie explains, “the meter is implied and sensed through the rhythm of tones. Rhythm and 
meter may coincide very closely, but they can be out of step, sometimes quite radically.” Begbie, Theology, 
Music, and Time, 41. 
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This is a wave structure in its own right. Begbie goes on to point out that this second-
order wave is called a “hypermeasure.” There is a third-order hypermeasure that links 
measures 17-20 and 21-24. Begbie identifies a fourth-order hypermeasure consisting of 
measures 17-24 and 25-32…and so on. These hypermeasures may (or may not, for there is 
no necessity in music) extend until the entire piece is expressed. 
 
Figure 4     F. Chopin, Waltz in A flat major, op. 34, measures 17-24 
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The patterns exhibited in the example are simple enough for even amateur 
musicians to recognize. And Begbie provides many other (more complicated) examples.37 
His point is that each temporal pattern falling on our ears is distinct but concurrently 
enmeshed with other patterns.  
This organization of hypermeasures is reminiscent of the mereological hierarchy 
that we saw in Figure 3 above.  
            
Figure 5   Mereological hierarchy of spatial entities and of musical time 
 
I mean to imply by Figure 5 simply that this hypothesis is worth further study: time may 
be in one important sense be as complexly organized as physical stuff. Such a claim 
cannot be fully defended in this context, but the comparison is suggestive enough to 
allow us to provisionally conclude that mechanical time, being flat (one level), is too 
simplistic to provide adequate description of our world. 
                                                 
37
 See also Jonathan D. Kramer, The Time of Music: New Meanings, New Temporalities, New Listening 
Strategies (New Yok & London: Schirmer, 1988). 
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The second way that music may provide a way out of our conceptual enslavement to 
mechanical time is that, in addition to understanding musical time as multi-leveled, it is 
also true that musical time is not linear. 
 
Musical time is directional yet not linear 
Musical expectations 
The diverse temporal patterns that constitute multi-leveled hypermeasures are likely 
to be indistinguishable to the listener (especially on the first hearing) and even to the 
professional musician (especially on the first playing). That measure 17 in the Chopin 
waltz begins a fifth-order hypermeasure, as Begbie claims, cannot be assessed at the 
downbeat of measure 17 but rather in retrospect from further down the line (e.g., from 
the vantage of measure 32 or later). Of course, even the casual listener may sometimes be 
surprised and delighted by a sudden musical turn.38 That is because the patterns of both 
tone and rhythm set up tacit expectations which may be fulfilled later on in various ways 
(musical reprise, musical joke, musical irony, etc.). That expectations are set up early and 
fulfilled later shows there is undeniable directionality to musical time. Yet while 
directional, musical time is not linear. Music is not simply one note after the other any 
more than history is one thing after another. For, in addition to expectations that are set 
up in the present and fulfilled in the future, there are two other temporal features of 
musical time that evade capture by the reductionist linearity of the mechanical model. 
Endlessness 
                                                 
38
 E.g., Mozart's musical joke, the very last couple bars of K522 -IV Presto. 
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On the one hand there is an endlessness to musical time. The sameness of 
mechanical time entails a kind of drudgery, since each successive nanosecond is the same 
as the last. But a given piece of music is able to gesture, even to yearn beyond the border 
of the (closing) double bar. My favorite example is Duruflé’s Fourth Motet. The choral 
text is surfeit with praise to the Trinity culminating with a drawn out “Amen.” But the last 
chord doesn’t sound right. Since it does not return to the tonic chord of the key, the ear is 
restless. There is an earlier hint that the tonic will come, but then it never does. The ear 
waits, even yearns for a future which is unlike the present, a future in which there is 
closure and fulfillment. 
In terms of meter (rather than tone), Begbie gives a complicated example of musical 
endlessness. The form of the Sonata is Introduction, Exposition & Development, 
Recapitulation (and sometimes a Reprise). The long middle section, Exposition & 
Development, is a unit with strong closure. At the moment of closure, the piece is 
tonically resolved (i.e., it returns to the root note of the key) and in the Sonata form both 
rhythm (played) and meter (intuited) close in agreement (rather than discord) at the end 
of the Exposition & Development. But just then the final section (Recapitulation) begins. 
The strong accented metrical beat of the hyper[measure] (the return to the 
tonic) is followed by weak beats within the recapitulation, but there is not 
another first beat of comparable strength to complete the wave. Hence the 
entire movement [i.e., the Sonata as a whole] can be described as a complete 
hyper[measure] followed by an incomplete one. So, in the field of key, a 
cadence is a closure, but in the field of meter it occurs prior to closure and 
demands (metric) resolution. In one sense [i.e., in terms of tone] the music 
resolves; in another [i.e., in terms of meter] it strives ahead toward 
resolution….The music is projected beyond the final cadence into the ensuing 
silence. (126) 
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On Begbie’s view, this “unfinishedness” makes the Sonata form eschatological by nature. 
Said differently, the Sonata form (and others) look to a future that is necessarily unlike 
the present. In stark contrast, mechanical time is marked by perpetual sameness: the 
future can only be exactly like the present. There is nothing in the mechanical model of 
time that helps us understand the source and end of temporally transcendent longing.  
Temporal contextuality 
Finally, not only does musical time differ from mechanical time in its ability to 
gesture into a future outside itself, musical time is also constituted by a present that is 
only intelligible in light of what precedes and follows, in light of past and future. 
Wittgenstein asks, “Doesn’t the [musical] theme point to anything beyond itself? Oh Yes! 
But this means: the impression it makes on me is connected with things in its 
environment….A theme, no less than a face, wears an expression.”39 We can read the 
expression (the look) of our friends because we connect it with previous interactions, we 
connect it with the whole of their lives with us up till now. We understand today’s 
expression in light of what life together was like yesterday. But that isn’t all. We are 
sometimes compelled to reinterpret today’s looks and expressions in light of what 
happens tomorrow. What holds for a facial expression, a line of poetry, a sentence in a 
play or story, or a comment spoken over dinner also holds for music: the intelligibility of 
the present is a function of both what precedes and follows. Begbie observes that in 
Beethoven’s String Quartet no. 7 in F major, op. 59, no. 1, the return to the tonic is “spread 
out, dissipated, over five timepoints” (103). Each of the five only makes sense in light of 
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 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 51-52. 
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the others and all five together only make sense in light of the whole. (Which is why we 
are drawn to listen to music again and again and again.) Mechanical time can make no 
sense of such temporal loopiness. For mechanical time, the past is gone, the future is not 
yet, and the present has no duration. But in musical time, 
We are not given an evaporating present but a present through which the past 
is directed towards the future, or—to put it another way—with phenomena 
which in their physicality are intrinsically and very closely bound to earlier and 
later musical occurrences. (67) 
 
Conclusion 
The task of this paper was to sketch two lines of a defense for Murphy’s oft-
misunderstood position that humans have no souls. Her claim is not so much a denial as 
a grammatical remark: the word “soul” does not refer to the sort of thing we possess; souls 
are not “things” at all. I have argued that readers will perpetually misunderstand Murphy 
so long as they (1) insist on a particular way of drawing the boundary between “inner” and 
“outer” and (2) unwittingly kowtowing to a mechanical model of time. In the first 
instance, I deflated the insistence by proposing that the division between “inner” and 
“outer” is better conceived as constituted by a series of “skins.” In the second instance, I 
shed light on the inability of the mechanical model of time to account for the nature of 
that noblest of human activities, the making of music. This second move aimed to 
counter our need to locate the soul “somewhere” by restoring attunement with 
temporality over the totalizing lure of spatiality. 
 Then Sings My Soul  28 
I return in closing to the epigram: “What must the world be like, what must I be like, 
if between me and the world the phenomenon of music can occur?”40 If Begbie’s analysis 
holds and time may be conceived in some sense as consubstantial with music41 and the 
human soul in some sense as consubstantial with both time and music, then we are in 
desperate need of a change of figure. 
Sir Edward Elgar composed Variations on an Original Theme for Orchestra 
("Enigma"), Op. 36, in the winter of 1898-9. Like Mozart’s variations on “Twinkle, Twinkle 
Little Star,” each variation is a beautiful piece in its own right. But unlike Mozart’s, Elgar 
took a mystery with him to his grave. Each variation was composed to delight (or to 
infuriate!) by capturing in music each of his friends particular idiosyncrasies (thus each 
variation is labeled with the friend’s initials). As these particularities have become widely 
known, the identities of the friends are not the enigma. Rather, the enigma is that the 
main theme is never identified! Each variation is a harmonizable tune meant to be played 
on top of the common theme. If ever identified, the missing theme would complete and 
unify the entire work. Without the theme each variation (each friend) is beautiful, but 
beautiful in isolation. Many musical themes have been proposed, but the answer will 
never be certain since the secret died with Elgar. 
Perhaps here we have the beginning of a better conception of the soul. Pascal once 
said each human soul was materially incomplete, lacking an enormous piece that only an 
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 Cited by Begbie, Theology, Music, and Time, 55.  
41
 As far as music is concerned, time is neither a container which music fills, nor is it a river along 
which music floats. Rather, time is “consubstantial with the tones themselves, with the particular melody 
they form. Here one thinks not in time but with time; indeed one thinks time itself in the form of the tones.” 
Ibid., 54. 
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“infinite object,” God in Christ, can fill. A hole in the soul? Why not rather understand the 
soul as a musical variation on a missing theme? What human beings quest for is not a 
missing “piece,” but a missing tune. Jesus is that tune. 
